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Reform of financial services has been one of the major development de- 
vices used in Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) in the 1990s. 
Although  the service sector has been recognized as a key to growth by 
many great economists, the sector is viewed with hostility by intellectuals 
and society in general. In Taiwan, the sector has long been discriminated 
against by industrial policy. The reform of the Taiwanese business service 
sector is treated as a key stimulus to the country’s further economic devel- 
opment, but there are some structural dilemmas in the reform program. 
Using the financial system as an example, this paper illuminates the re- 
form policies and the recent problems of the business service sector in 
Taiwan. Section 7.1 will briefly depict the significance of and the hostility 
to the business service sector. Section 7.2 reviews the financial system in 
Taiwan, followed by  a brief account of the liberalization of the financial 
sector by  the government in section 7.3.  Section 7.4 compares financial 
development in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. It is shown that a couple of 
Taiwan’s structural problems have gone unnoticed. Section 7.5 addresses 
these problems. A final section provides some concluding remarks. 
7.1  The Significance of and Hostility to the Business Service Sector 
According to Adam Smith, economic development is driven by the divi- 
sion of labor and specialization, and the division of labor is limited by the 
extent of the market. To extend the market, money is used as a medium 
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of exchange to replace barter transactions (Smith [1776] 1976, chaps. 3 
and 4). 
Adam Smith is arguing that the market will be extended by decreasing 
transactions costs. In the reduction  of  transactions costs, using money 
as a medium of exchange is a revolution. The development and specializa- 
tion of the business service sector is likewise vital. The business service 
sector concerned here primarily performs intermediation  or transaction 
services and is closely related to what Wallis and North (1986) defined as 
the “transaction sector.” The business service sector is important because 
gains  from  the  division  of  labor  and  specialization  are  only  realized 
through  exchange. “The development  of  specialized banking,  finance, 
trade, and other transaction functions are the necessary requirements of 
enhancing productivity” (Wallis and North 1986, 121). Economic growth 
is therefore closely tied to the reduction of exchange costs and the increase 
of the business service sector that permit the realization of gains from 
greater specialization and the division of labor. 
Although the business service sector plays an important intermediating 
role in  realizing gains of exchange, the hostility to the sector has long 
been widespread. 
Chinese tradition discriminates against merchants, calling them the last 
of the four classes of people  (intellectuals, farmers, artisans, and mer- 
chants). People are used to looking down on merchants, regarding com- 
merce as a lowly occupation and using the terms “vile” and “mean” to 
describe it. This is not only prevalent in the East but also common in the 
West. Adam Smith stated that in the rude state of society, “to trade was 
disgraceful to a gentleman” (1976, 2:442). Throughout history, as F.  A. 
Hayek cited William H. McNeill’s statement, “merchants were objects of 
very general disdain and moral opprobrium. . . ,  a man who bought cheap 
and sold dear was fundamentally dishonest. . . . Merchant behaviour vio- 
lated patterns of mutuality that prevailed within primary groupings.” And 
Eric Hoffer once remarked, “The hostility, in particular of the scribe, to- 
wards the merchant is as old as recorded history” (Hayek 1988, 90). 
In the advanced Western societies, such statements as “activities such 
as barter and exchange and more elaborate forms of trade, the organiza- 
tion or direction of activities, and shifting about of available goods for 
sale in accordance with profitability, are still not always even regarded as 
real work” (Hayek 1988, 92) may only be found in history. In Taiwan, the 
emphasis  on industry at the expense of commerce is  being revealed in 
industrial policy. The 1960 Act for Encouraging Investment and the subse- 
quent 1992 Act for Upgrading Industry provide tax holidays, accelerated 
depreciation, and lower interest rates. Basically these acts apply only to 
the manufacturing sector, which is designated as “productive.” Both acts 
preclude service industries from enjoying all benefits. It was not until 1995 
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and authorized to enjoy the privileges provided by the Act for Upgrading 
Industry. Electrical rates are set to discriminate against merchants. The 
manufacturing sector enjoys a one-third discount on the electricity bill 
paid by household, but service industries must pay one-third more. Until 
1996, some cabinet members in Taiwan still publicly appealed to young 
people  to  not  work  for  service companies such  as McDonald’s; they 
should instead work in “productive” factories. 
7.2  The Financial System in Taiwan 
The financial system in Taiwan has three significant features. The first 
is its “financial dualism.” The dual financial system consists of a formal 
system and an informal system, or the curb markets (see table 7.1). The 
former includes all institutions and markets established according to fi- 
nancial laws or rules and subject to regulation by the financial authorities. 
The informal system is composed of all the markets not set up according 
to formal financial laws or rules. It engages in lending and borrowing ac- 
tivities without being under the direct regulation  or supervision of the 
financial authorities, though it is tolerated by them. 
The financial authorities regarding the formal system, with the excep- 
tion of the credit associations and credit departments of farmer and fish- 
ery associations, are the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Central Bank 
of China. Prior to 1995, the Cooperative Bank of Taiwan was authorized 
by MOF and the central bank to be the auditing agency for credit cooper- 
atives. The direct authorities over the credit departments of  farmer and 
fishery associations are the Ministry of the Interior and the Council of 
Agriculture. Each of the three kinds of credit co-ops operates on a small 
scale in a fairly small geographic area. They were privileged substitutes for 
commercial banks when private banks were completely prohibited before 
1990. The financial conditions of most co-ops are shaky. Many of them 
have had runs; a few have even suffered bankruptcy, especially after the 
liberalization of private banks.  Some of them have been taken  over by 
Cooperative Bank of Taiwan or merged into other institutions. There are 
still many frail credit co-ops that may fail in the near future. 
Taiwan has had significant curb financial markets for a long time. After 
World War 11, the Nationalist government expropriated all Japanese busi- 
nesses, included organized financial institutions, to make up the state- 
owned enterprises that constituted more than 90 percent of medium-sized 
and large nonagricultural industries in the island at that time. Curb mar- 
kets evolved from the traditional financial sector and were prohibited from 
becoming modern financial institutions. They grew along with the early 
development of the private nonagricultural sector, which  overtook  the 
public sector by  the mid-1960s. In 1964-66,  private businesses relied on 
curb markets for about half of the funds they needed, according to statis- 230  Ching-hsi Chang 
Table 7.1  Financial System in Taiwan 
Formal Financial System 
Financial institutions 
Monetary institutions 
Central Bank of China (Taiwan)p 
(Full service) domestic banks 
Commercial banks 
Specialized banks’ 
Foreign banks (local branches) 
Medium business banks 
Cooperatives 
Cooperative Bank of Taiwanp 
Credit cooperative associations 
Credit departments of farmer 
Credit departments of fishery 
associationsp 
associationsp 
Other financial institutions 
Postal Remittances and Savingsp 
Investment and trust 
Investment and trust companies 
Units of commercial banks 
China Development Corp.k 
Life insurance companies 
Property and casualty insurance 






Bill financial companies 
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corp.k 




Offshore banking centers 
Units of domestic banks 
Units of foreign banks 
Foreign exchange market 
Foreign currency call-loan market 
PPublicly controlled. 
KMT controlled. 
Informal Financial System 
Market-specific organizations 
Installment credit companies 
Leasing companies 
Investment companies 
Rotating credit co-ops 
Credit unions 
Other unorganized markets 
Secured borrowing and lending 
Unsecured borrowing and lending 
Loans against postdated checks 
Deposits with firms 
Mutual loans and savings 







Types of transactions 
tics gathered by the central bank (see fig. 7.1). Since then, the curb market 
ratio fluctuated around 35 percent through 1990 and dropped to below 25 
percent after the new  banks commenced operations in the early 1990s. 
The average interest rate of loans in the curb markets is about two and 
half times that in commercial banks, as shown in figure 7.2. % 
1/81  1/82  1/83  1/84  1/85  1/86  1/87  1/88  1/89  1/90  1/91  1/92  1/93  1/Y4  1/95  1/96  1/97 
Fig. 7.2  Interest rates 
Source: Central Bank of China, Financial Sraristics Monthly (various issues). 
Note: The bank loan rate is the maximum interest rate on short-term unsecured loans; the 
bank deposit rate is the interest rate on one-year time savings deposits. The curb rate is the 
interest rate on unorganized, unsecured loans in Taipei. 232  Ching-hsi Chang 
The curb markets themselves improved the efficiency of  the financial 
system’s  operation  and  credit  allocation.  Shea  and  Kuo  (1984)  use 
1965-82  data to estimate the contribution and costs of  the informal sys- 
tem. They find that efficiency improvements by  curb markets increased 
GDP by  1.23 percent on average during the period. At the same time, 
compared to the “most” efficient resource allocation under financial dual- 
ism, only 0.11 percent of GDP was lost. Shea (1994, 272) himself admits 
that the assumptions used for the estimation overstated the actual effi- 
ciency contribution. Besides, these estimates were done under prohibition 
of  private banks  and financial  repression.  Compared to a competitive 
market, there are two major costs of financial repression and dualism: 
inefficiencies and inequities. 
The first effect is allocative inefficiency of funds. According to Shea’s 
studies (see Patrick 1994), Taiwan’s financial deepening was a cause of its 
rapid real economic growth (326), which was propelled by small business 
(358). However, despite rhetoric about helping small business, the relation- 
ship between the government and small business was especially negative 
(363). The focus of government credit programs was big enterprises and 
big projects (355). Small business was excluded from the organized market 
and had to bear the burden  of substantially higher interest costs in the 
curb markets. Moreover, these static costs are surely smaller than the dy- 
namic consequences of inefficient investment allocation. 
The second effect is increasing inequality of income and wealth. Repres- 
sion created  economic rents. The huge rents created  static distribution 
effects and dynamic development effects. The power to allocate credit on 
preferential terms creates potential for abuse, corruption, and other politi- 
cal economy problems. As Patrick observes “In Korea and Taiwan, . . . 
occasional scandals and anecdotal evidence . . . suggest . . . a considerable 
portion appears to have gone to support the state apparatus-the  political 
parties  and  leadership  in  what  were  after  all,  rather  authoritarian re- 
gimes”(  1994, 337-38).  Dynamically, rent-seeking  activities exhibit very 
natural increasing returns, and rent seeking, particularly public rent seek- 
ing by government officials, is likely to hurt innovative activities more than 
everyday production  (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny  1993). Further, be- 
cause consumer loans, except housing loans which could be sought from 
formal institutions using the real estate as collateral, had to rely on the 
curb markets, there were further inefficiencies and inequities in the form 
of less improvements in welfare-less  consumption-than  in measured 
GNP performance (Patrick 1994, 367-68).  These kinds of consumer loans 
were completely ignored in the central bank’s statistics on curb markets, 
which are shown in figure 7.1. 
The other two features characterizing the Taiwanese financial system 
are intertwined. The first of these features is the absolute majority of pub- 
licly owned institutions in the formal system. In fact, the financial dualism 
was due to the exclusive publicly owned banks in the formal financial sys- The Reform of the Business Service Sector in Taiwan  233 
tem coupled with the fact that the government has turned a blind eye to 
the informal markets. Before 1990, there were only three private banks in 
the formal system, all of which were licensed to overseas Chinese. The 
second of these features is the many KMT-owned (or at least controlled) 
financial institutions. KMT is the abbreviation for the Kuomintang, the 
ruling party of Taiwan since the end of World War 11. 
Table 7.2 shows the number of Taiwanese formal financial institutions 
and branches between  1961 and 1995. Before the liberalization brought 
about the new Bank Law of 1989, which took effect after 1992, there were 
virtually no structural changes in the formal system, except the establish- 
ment of investment and bill companies, and the intrusion of KMT institu- 
tions. Table 7.3 shows the total assets of formal financial institutions in 
1990 and 1995, reflecting their relative importance. In these two tables, 
the financial institutions are classified into three groups, namely, publicly 
controlled, KMT controlled, and privately controlled institutions. KMT- 
controlled institutions are isolated from the other groups because, on the 
one hand, the KMT is the ruling party, having possessed exclusive political 
power for fifty years in Taiwan, so that there is almost no difference be- 
tween the KMT party and the Nationalist government, while on the other 
hand, the institutions controlled by  the KMT are different from publicly 
controlled institutions in terms of their legal status. 
The structure and development of the Taiwanese financial system, both 
formal and informal systems, has been well depicted by  Shea (1994) and 
Yang (1994), except the misleading picture presented of KMT- and state- 
controlled enterprises and privatization, to be discussed below. Over time 
the share of publicly controlled financial institutions has been decreasing 
and those of the other two groups increasing. In  1995, the government 
controlled 67 percent of all kinds of formal financial institutions in num- 
ber as well as in assets, the ruling party (KMT) held 3 percent in number 
and nearly 5 percent in assets and the private sector possessed 30 percent 
in number and 28 percent in assets.' In the financial service sector, the 
KMT operates almost all types of formal financial institutions, many of 
which are monopolies or oligopolies authorized by itself (the ruling party). 
Several informal financial institutions are also owned by  the KMT, as 
shown in table 7.4 (see also Bruton 1993; Baum 1994). All these KMT fi- 
nancial businesses, and numerous other businesses, are under the control of 
its seven holding companies or investment companies like the China De- 
velopment Corporation. The Central Investment Holding Company, one 
of the biggest holding companies in Taiwan, was listed in a political ency- 
clopedia  as the  only  example of  a political  party's  receiving its funds 
through an enterprise (Delury 1987, 1077). 
Government interventions in the financial sector can be classified into 
1. Stock securities, including Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, which is controlled by 
the KMT, are not included in table 7.3. Table 7.2  Number of Formal Financial Institutions in Taiwan 
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9  247  256  1.00  11  365  376  0.98  12  505  517  0.98  13  678  691  0.94  13  929 
1  1  2  0.00  1  16  17  0.02  3  91 
1  0  1  0.00  2  6  8  0.02  2  9  11  0.02  2  27  29  0.04  18  341 
10  247  257  1.00  13  371  384  1.00  15  515  530  1.00  16  721  737  1.00  34  1,361 
1  1.00 
1  1.00 
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1  0.04 
3  0.12 
22  0.85 
26  1.00 
1  6  7  0.13  1  9  10  0.19 
2  6  8  0.15  1  2  3  0.06 
5  34  39  0.72  3  38  41  0.76 
8  46  54  1.00  5  49  54  1.00  0  1  1.00 
450  451  1.00  609  610  1.00  1  95  1  952  1.00  1  1,201  1,202  1.00  1  1,268  1,269  1.00 
1  450  451  1.00  1  609  610  1.00  1  95  1  952  1.00  1  1,201  1,202  1.00  1  1,268  1,269  1.00 
3  5  8  1.00  3  6  9  0.26  3  6  9  0.15  3  6  9  0.12  3  6  9  0.08 
1  0  1  0.01 
12  55  67  0.88  27  77  104  0.91 
15  61  76  1.00  31  83  114  1.00 
6 
9 
20  26  0.74  6 
26  35  1.00  9 
46 
52 
52  0.85 
61  1.00  3  5  8  1.00 
10  12  0.29  2 
0  1  0.02  1 
17  28  0.68  11 
27  41  1.00  14 
14  0.20 
2  0.03 
54  0.77 
70  1.00 
3  14  17  0.17  3  16  19  0.16 
1  4  5  0.05  1  5  6  0.05 
16  60  76  0.78  19  78  97  0.80 
20  78  98  1.00  23  99  122  1.00 
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(continued) Table 7.2  (continued) 
1961  1970  1980  1990  1995 
Type and Control”  Co.  Bra.  Units  Ratio  Co.  Bra.  Units  Ratio  Co.  Bra.  Units  Ratio  Co.  Bra.  Units  Ratio  Co.  Bra.  Units  Ratio 






2  2  4  0.50  2  11  13  0.62  2  15  17  0.37 
2  2  4  0.50  2  6  8  0.38  2  8  10  0.22 
10  9  19  0.41 
4  4  8  1.00  4  17  21  1.00  14  32  46  1.00 
Total 
Public  308  844  1,152  0.85  314  1,134  1,448  0.80  305  1,988  2,293  0.81  333  2,751  3,084  0.76  336  3,283  3,619  0.67 
KMT  1  1  0.00  6  5  11  0.00  6  32  38  0.01  9  158  167  0.03 
Private  94  112  206  0.15  109  250  359  0.20  106  426  532  0.19  116  802  918  0.23  156  1,441  1,597  0.30 
Sum  402  956  1,358  1.00  424  1,384  1,808  1.00  417  2,419  2,836  1.00  455  3,585  4,040  1.00  501  4,882  5,383  1.00 
Sources: Central Bank of China, List of  Financial Institutions (Taipei, 1996), and Central Bank of China, Financial Statistics Monthly (various issues). 
Note: Co. = number of companies; Bra. = number of branches 
’“Public” means publicly controlled financial institutions, which include, in addition to undisputed ones, International Commercial Bank of China, Taiwan 
Business Bank, Directorate General of Post Remittances and Savings Bank, credit departments of farmer and fishery associations, Taiwan Development and 
Trust Co., China Bills Finance Co., International Bills Finance Co., Taiwan Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Chung Kuo Insurance Co., and Taiwan Life 
Insurance Co. “KMT” means KMT-controlled institutions, which include Sinopad Commercial Bank, United World Chinese Commercial Bank, Chinatrust 
Commercial Bank, Kaohsiung Business Bank (after 1995), China Development Corp., China United Trust and Investment Co. (before 1994), Chung Hsing 
Bills Finance Co., Fuh-Hwa Securities Finance Co., Central Insurance Co., and Shin Fu Life Insurance Co. Table 7.3  Total Assets of Financial Institutions in Taiwan (million NT dollars) 
1990  1995 
Type  Public 
Central bank 
Domestic banks 
Local branches of foreign banks 
Credit cooperatives 
Credit departments of farmer associations 
Credit departments of fishery associations 
Investment and trust companies 
Bill finance companies 
2,646,854 
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(continued) Table 7.3  (continued) 
~~  ~  ~  ~~  ______ 
1990  1995 
Type  Public  KMT  Private  Total  Public  KMT  Private  Total 
Securities finance companies 
Property and casualty insurance companies 
Life insurance companies 
Central reinsurance company 
Property and casualty insurance cooperatives 




























[ 1  .OOO] 
39,585 
(0.767) 
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[  1  .OOO] 
(1.000) 
23,438,045 
Sources: Central Bank of' China, Statistics of  Important Business of Financial Institutions (Taipei, 1990, 1995), Central Bank of China, Financial Statistics 
Monthly (March 1997). 
Note: Medium business banks and postal savings systems are included in domestic banks; the other categories are the same as in table 7.2. Numbers in 
parentheses are horizontal percentages. Numbers in brackets are vertical percentages. The Reform of the Business Service Sector in Taiwan  239 
Table 7.4  Kuomintang-Controlled Financial Businesses, 1997 
Holding Companies  I  Formal Financial System 
Central Investment Holding Co. 
Founded 1971, investing 70 companies 
1995 Assets: NT$40.8 billion; profits $4.4 
billion 
Hua Hsia Investment Holding Co. 
Founded 1975 (unofficially, 1991 officially) 
1995 Assets: $7 billion; profits: $680 million 
Founded 1979, investing 51 companies 
1995 Equity: $15.1 billion; profits: $1.7 billion 
Founded 1991, overseas investment 
Founded 1988, oversees 17 companies 
1994 Profits: $105 million 
Jen Hwa Investment Holding Co. 
Oversees Grand Cathay Securities 
King-Dom Investment Holding Co. 
Oversees insurance investments 
Kuang Hwa Investment Holding Co. 
Asia Pacific Holding Co. 
Chii Sheng Industrial Co. 
Financial institutions 
Commercial banks 
Sinopad Commercial Bank 
Chinatrust Commercial Bank 
United World Chinese Commercial Bank 
Kaohsiung Business Bank 
China Development Corp. 
Shin Fu Life Insurance Co. 
Central Insurance Co. 
Medium business banks 
Investment and trust 
Life insurance companies 
Property and casualty insurance companies 
Money market 
Chung Hsing Bills Finance Co. 
Capital Market 
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corp. 
Fuh-Hwa Securities Finance 
Securities dealers and traders 
China Trust Investment Co. 
Grand Cathay Securities Co. 
International Investment Trust Co. 
Informal Financial System 
Leasing companies 
Central Leasing Co. 
Investment companies 
Central Link Investment Consulting Co. 
China Investment and Development Co. 
Global Investment Holding Co. 
Grand Cathay Venture Capital Co. 
International Venture Capital Investment 
Tai Shin Venture Capital Co. 
Universal Venture Capital Investment Corp. 
Corp. 
Source: Laurie Underwood, “How Big is Big?” Topics 27, no. 4 (May 1997): 29-32. 
two types, preventive interventions and positive interventions. Preventive 
interventions  are those measures meant to keep the system transparent 
and to prevent bankruptcy. These measures include reserve requirements, 
equity ratios, deposit rates, deposit insurance, auditing and disclosure of 
information, and measures against insider trading. Positive interventions 
consist of limitations on new financial institutions and products, regulated 
prices of financial services, and strategic financial policies. In Taiwan, pos- 
itive measures  in  the  past  included  strict  entry  restrictions  on private 
banks, limits on new branches, government ownership of  financial insti- 240  Ching-hsi Chang 
tutions, interest rate controls, restrictions on foreign banks, authorization 
of bank  products,  and preferential  policies for exports,  for small and 
medium-size businesses, and for strategic industries (based on high linkage 
effects, promising market potential, high tech, high value added, low en- 
ergy consumption, and low pollution). The strategic financial policies have 
let the Development Fund of the Executive Yuan create some investment 
funds and development corporations. 
For preventive banking regulation, according to Baltensperger and Der- 
mine (1987), there are three motives: bank  safety and overall financial 
stability, monetary control, and prevention of monopoly activity and con- 
centration. It is widely recognized in Taiwan that the most success has 
been achieved in terms of monetary control and price stability. There has 
been total failure in terms of making the system more transparent and 
preventing monopoly, concentration, and insider manipulation. Results 
have been somewhat in between in terms of financial safety and stability 
(see Shea 1994, Yang 1994, 1997; Patrick 1994). The positive interventions 
have often been criticized as being inefficient and hampering past growth. 
Specifically, for example, most small and medium-size firms could not ob- 
tain funds from the formal financial system or take advantage of the stra- 
tegic preferential policies, except for export credits. They have had to pur- 
sue underground  capital bearing a much higher interest  rate (see Shea 
1994, 233; and fig. 7.2). In general, much of the financial inefficiency and 
underdevelopment were blamed on the high degree of government inter- 
vention in interest rate determination, as well as in financial intermedia- 
tion, market structure, and banking operations (Shea 1994,222). 
7.3  The Liberalization of Financial Policy 
Financial reform in Taiwan is a long and accelerating process. Since the 
financial system was heavily regulated and broadly criticized as a back- 
ward sector damaging the whole economy, the financial deregulation has 
been under way for a long time. The financial reform embraces liberaliza- 
tion, privatization,  and internationalization. Financial liberalization in- 
cludes interest rate decontrol, market entry deregulation,  and so forth. 
Privatization of government banks has been discussed and the authorities 
decided to reduce the government’s equity in the three biggest commercial 
banks (First, Hua-Nan, and Chang-Hua) to below 50 percent by offering 
part of the stock in the market. This policy is controversial because the 
government will still wholly control the banks by holding some 40 percent 
of stock. Nevertheless, nothing was done until  the end of  1997. While 
internationalization may not be segregated from liberalization, the govern- 
ment is mainly concerned with policies related to the development of Tai- 
wan into an Asia-Pacific financial center. 
The financial liberalization has been going ahead since the mid-1970s The Reform of the Business Service Sector in Taiwan  241 
and was speeded up in the late  1980s. The major deregulations can be 
summarized as follows. 
1. Brunches: The regulations governing branching by  existing banks 
were relaxed in  1984, allowing each qualified bank to set up three full- 
service branches and three limited-service agencies per year, as compared 
with two of each previously. 
2.  Interest rates: Decontrol has proceeded in several steps since 1975. 
The fixed and uniform rates (in formal financial markets) were gradually 
relaxed and were completely floated after 1989 when the new  Bank Law 
was promulgated. However, since most of the major banks are still govern- 
ment controlled, competition is less than complete. 
3.  Bank activities: The 1989 Bank Law granted MOF the power to au- 
thorize new financial products.  For example, bill transactions formerly 
conducted only by  bill finance companies were opened to some private 
banks in 1992. 
4.  Private bunks: The 1989 Bank Law liberalized regulations concern- 
ing the establishment of new private banks.  Fifteen new private banks, 
each with a minimum equity of NT$10 billion required by  the law, were 
granted charters in 1991. By  May 1997, nineteen new private banks were 
established and operating, creating better service attitudes, even in public 
banks, and more competition in the whole banking industry. 
5. Foreign exchange: The central bank introduced a floating system in 
1978 but still continuously intervened up until the mid-l980s, which re- 
sulted in an undervaluation of the NT dollar, huge trade surpluses, short- 
term speculative capital inflows, and a boosted money supply. In 1987, 
the authorities phased out most of the controls and liberalized long-term 
exchange rates, and by  1990 liberalized short-term exchange rates. 
6. Foreign bunks: Before liberalizing private banks owned and operated 
by Taiwanese, foreign banks were allowed to set up local branches in Tai- 
wan. But only one branch would be approved for each foreign bank before 
1986 in Taipei. This was gradually relaxed, and by  1994 there were no 
more restrictions  on the number of branches if  the transmitted capital 
from their head offices is over NT$I 50 million for the first branch and over 
NT$l.2 million for each additional branch. Banks were also authorized to 
open branches in Kaohsiung and Taichung in 1985 and 1990, respectively. 
By  far the most ambitious reform of Taiwan’s financial institutions has 
been the plan for developing Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific Regional Opera- 
tions Center (CEPD 1995). The core of the plan is the designation of six 
specific operation  centers-a  manufacturing center,  sea transportation 
center, air transportation center, financial center, telecommunications cen- 
ter, and media center. According to CEPD, developing Taiwan as a finan- 
cial center means “establishing it as a base from which domestic and for- 
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the East Asian region” (1995, 22-30).  In the short term, the plan empha- 
sizes the development of offshore financial markets, a derivative market, 
a gold market, bond and securities markets, the stock market, and the 
insurance market. For example, offshore financial markets include the es- 
tablishment of a regional fund-raising center, foreign exchange market, 
offshore banking market, and foreign currency call-loan market. 
“Concrete measures,” as stated in  CEPD, are to relax restrictions on 
inward and outward capital transfers, on foreign banks, on the operations 
of financing companies, and on “cross-(Taiwan)Strait” regulation, to en- 
act reasonable taxation of financial transactions, to speed up the privatiza- 
tion of state-owned banks, which includes enacting the Law Governing 
the Administration of State-Owned Financial Institutions and reviewing 
the classification and separation of banking activities. Other complemen- 
tary policies are the training of financial personnel and the establishment 
of infrastructure such as building an international financial complex and 
improving the quality of telecommunications facilities. 
In fact, the idea of a regional financial center began in 1982 when the 
Executive Yuan approved the Project of Uplifting Taiwan’s Position in 
East Asia. In accordance with the project, the Offshore Banking Center 
was set up in 1984, but only the International Commercial Bank of China 
(Taiwan) established an offshore banking unit. The internationalization 
process was very slow before 1987 when exchange controls were relaxed. 
The important measures adopted by the end of 1990 consisted of capital 
flow deregulation; access to the domestic financial market, for example, 
liberalizing branching and activities of foreign banks, creating an offshore 
banking center, and setting up financial institutions abroad for which the 
restrictions limiting overseas branches by  domestic banks were lifted in 
1988 by  MOF; and establishment  of  the Taipei Foreign Currency  Call 
Loan Market.  However, if  the system of government ownership is  not 
changed, the prospects for the regional financial center plan can hardly 
be optimistic. 
7.4  Comparisons of the Financial Development 
of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan 
One way to understand the Taiwanese financial system, its reform and 
problems, is to compare them with those of Japan and Korea. The three 
countries share common economic and institutional circumstances and 
patterns  of  development,  but  they  also  have  certain  significant differ- 
ences2 
As for major similarities, commercial banks have been the core of all 
three financial systems, and capital markets were developed later and are 
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relatively unimportant. The systems have been characterized by separation 
between the formal and informal  sectors and between commercial and 
investment banking,  and within banking by  segmentation by  borrower 
and function  (e.g., see  table  7.1). All  three  countries pursued  export- 
oriented  development  strategies while  concurrently  protecting  most  of 
their domestic production from imports to support their preeminent ob- 
jective of rapid growth. To  achieve macroeconomic  goals, the financial 
authorities have used their control of the financial system to channel funds 
to investment in priority sectors through, for example, central bank redis- 
count of export trade bills at low interest rates. The three economies all 
lack reliable accounting and auditing systems and also lack publicly avail- 
able information on company performance, prospects, and hence credit- 
worthiness. Banks have therefore found it cheaper and safer to require 
collateral, usually specific real assets, against loans rather than rely on the 
business performance of borrowers. Accordingly, banks are criticized for 
“pawnshop” banking. Supervision  by  the financial authorities  has not 
been transparent. Consequently, these countries have been denounced as 
“insider societies”-societies  taking the existence and utilization  of in- 
sider information for granted, making few efforts to prevent insider trade, 
and enforcing few penalties for misuse (Patrick 1994, 338, 353). 
Before deregulation began seriously in Japan in the 1970s and in Korea 
and Taiwan in the 198Os, the financial authorities held interest rates at 
below-market levels, restricted entry of new financial institutions and cre- 
ation of new financial instruments, segmented financial markets, and insu- 
lated domestic finance from world financial markets. The most important 
domestic regulations were government-established or sanctioned ceilings 
for interest rates on deposits, loans, and new bond issues-so-called  fi- 
nancial repression. Korea has been the most repressed of the three, Tai- 
wan next, and Japan the least (see table 7.5). Because of the degree and 
the implementation of the financial repression, the financial system and 
the indirect intervention by  the government have developed differently, 
Thus the consequences of financial repression were different in the three 
countries. 
In Japan, lending institutions evaded interest rate ceilings by requiring 
compensating balances or loan-related fee income, so that effective inter- 
est rates for the borrower were raised closer to the market level, and the 
possibilities of inefficient credit allocation and rent-seeking activities by 
the real sector were reduced accordingly. However, rents accrued to the 
banks in the form of higher profits, higher wages, less efficient manage- 
ment, and perhaps less risk taking in loan portfolios than would otherwise 
have been the case (Patrick 1994, 337). In Korea and Taiwan, recipients 
of rationed credit are major financial supporters of the political apparatus 
in power. In Korea, with the biggest interest rate gap among the three 
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Table 7.5  Indicators of Relative Financial Liberalization of Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan 
Indicator 
Japan  Korea  Taiwan 
1965  1990  1965  1990  1965  1990 
FIR“  3.62  6.62  0.89  4.55  1.61  4.95 
Overall level 
Domestic  Low  High  Low  Medium  Low  High 
International  Low  High  Low  Low  Low  Medium 
Ownership of banks  Low  Low  High  Low  High  Medium 
Credit allocation  Medium  Low  High  High  High  Medium 
Interest rate controls  High  Low  High  High  High  Low 
entry  None  None  None  Low  None  High 
Government involvement 
Possibility of new bank 
Source: Patrick (1994, 342). 
=.FIR stands for financial intermediation ratio (ratio of financial assets to GNP). 
ceived by big private business groups. The government not only forced the 
banks to make huge numbers of policy loans to selected firms in desig- 
nated industries, but foreign funds were also borrowed by the government 
and relent to those big business groups at interest rates substantially below 
market rates (Patrick  1994, 330, 335, 349, 351). In Taiwan, state enter- 
prises, which operate in major basic industries as well as public utilities, 
communications,  and transportation, were granted a large share of ra- 
tioned credit. The rest went to KMT enterprises, for obvious political rea- 
sons, well-managed big private enterprises, because of the conservative 
nature  of  state-owned  commercial  banks  where  severe penalties  were 
readily imposed on bank officials for defaulted loans, and export credits, 
due to the government’s industrial policy. 
Korea had a fundamental problem in the real sector because those big 
private business groups granted substantial profit margins and govern- 
ment  subsidies were generally producing “bleeding exports.” Japan’s fi- 
nancial institutions retained huge profits that inevitably invited all kind of 
scandals and fraudulent activities contrary to the interest of shareholders. 
In Taiwan, the profit margins on low-interest loans were partly engulfed 
by the inefficiency of public enterprises and KMT enterprises and partly 
embezzled by KMT enterprises and big private enterprises. Obviously the 
ruling party enjoyed both economic and political gains at the cost of in- 
efficiencies and inequities in the use of financial capital. 
Deregulation and liberalization of financial markets and institutions in 
all three countries has been a conscious, gradual, piecemeal process. Poli- 
cymakers decided to liberalize financial markets in response to changing 
circumstances-domestic  market forces, changing political constituencies 
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become less effective because the economies are now more mature, the 
curb markets undermined the regulated market, and current account sur- 
pluses created domestic liquidity and affected market interest rates. More- 
over, foreign pressures have compelled the economies to open their domes- 
tic  markets  to international  competition.  The  authorities  have  issued 
timetables to abolish credit and interest rate ceilings, relax entry and fi- 
nancial instrument barriers, and open the economies to international fi- 
nancial flows. These policies have been more or less implemented. Over 
time, the degree of  liberalization has been substantial, at least in Japan 
and Taiwan, as shown in table 7.5. 
Judging from what has happened during the Asian financial crisis of 
1997, Patrick (1  994) has almost perfectly summarized and distinguished 
these three countries’ financial development. However, two fundamental 
structural issues in Taiwan have been neglected. One is the spurious nature 
of privatization and the other is the existence of KMT enterprises. Patrick 
has made it clear that privatization is not equal to liberalization. He points 
out that even a decade after the banks were privatized in Korea, the gov- 
ernment still appointed new presidents for five of the commercial banks 
and continued to intrude into banks’ lending policies and management 
(Patrick  1994, 349). However, special problems concerning privatization 
in Taiwan have been totally neglected in all financial studies (see, e.g., 
Patrick 1994; Park 1994; Shea 1994; Yang 1994, 1997). 
Patrick is very sensitive in the interaction of the financial system and 
the sociopolitical  system. Since finance is a very  powerful instrument, 
when the power to allocate credit lies in the hands of the political and 
government bureaucratic authorities, the use of finance to support the po- 
litical apparatus in power, to finance elections, and to reward supporters 
has been condemned (Patrick 1994, 337, 338, 366). Nevertheless, Patrick 
does not mention the involvement of  the KMT in the financial market, 
although Yang (1994, 299) briefly describes KMT enterprises in the same 
volume (Patrick and Park 1994). These and other issues will be addressed 
in the next section. 
7.5  Evaluation of Financial Reform in Taiwan 
As mentioned before and as Ito and Krueger (1996, 2) have stated, Tai- 
wan’s financial deregulation has been due at least in part to the ineffec- 
tiveness of earlier types of regulation that came under stress from world- 
wide financial integration. In other words, international pressures have 
played a significant role in the financial liberalization in Taiwan. Hence, 
before criticizing the financial reform policy, it is worthwhile to point out 
the importance of internationalization. In fact, the export-oriented strat- 
egy itself serves as a built-in ratchet to check all domestic policies that 
threaten global competitiveness. 
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up a regional financial center include (1) good location; (2) competent 
marine transportation; (3)  massive international trade; (4) huge trade sur- 
pluses and cumulative foreign reserves, which are especially beneficial for 
a regional funding center; and (5)  the Hong Kong situation after 1997. Its 
disadvantages are (1) inefficiency of government administration; (2) poor 
infrastructure including local communication and transportation; (3)  lack 
of internationally experienced personnel; (4) existing government-owned 
financial institutions; (5) lack of comparable internationalized  financial 
regulations in such areas as foreign exchange control, international fi- 
nance, deposits of foreigners and foreign deposits of Taiwanese, and the 
tax system; and (6) the political difficulty of Taiwan’s government joining 
the international community. Obviously, financial internationalization will 
solve many of these problems. Moreover, international pressure has always 
been the best means to liberalize domestic restrictions in Taiwan. A num- 
ber of historical events support this viewpoint. 
U.S. aid to Taiwan after the Korean War had an important influence in 
creating Taiwan’s booming private enterprise system. “Without the inter- 
vention of  AID (Agency for International Development), private enter- 
prise would not have become, by  1965, the mainspring in Taiwan’s econ- 
omy” (Jacoby 1966, 138). A leading example of AID’S promotion of the 
private sector was the establishment of the China Development Corpora- 
tion in  1959, which was considered “the most important aid-sponsored 
industrial finance intermediary . .  . with original capital provided by a De- 
velopment Loan Fund loan” (191).3 
In the 198Os, due to preferential financial policies toward exports, in- 
cluding an undervaluation of the NT dollar, Taiwan had abundant trade 
surpluses, which accumulated huge foreign reserves. Although this created 
substantial inflationary  pressure,  the belief  that  “only exports matter” 
could not be changed. Prolonged criticism by many local economists and 
some government officials proved of little use. It was in response to pres- 
sure from the US.  government that Taiwan started to liberalize its foreign 
exchange rate controls (Yang 1997). Also in the 198Os, U.S. pressure played 
a determinate role in opening markets in banking, insurance, telecommu- 
nications, and other service sectors for domestic investors. In fact, in many 
cases liberalization policies affected foreigners much earlier than they did 
domestic business. For example, local branches of foreign banks (all pri- 
vately owned) were welcomed much earlier than private domestic banks, 
which only became legal in 1989.4 
Even today, U.S. pressure to open up the telecommunications business 
3. Interestingly enough, China Development Corporation is now a KMT-controlled ven- 
ture capital company and serves as the headquarters of  the KMT enterprises. 
4.  The free import of tobacco and wine (made by foreign private firms) coupled with the 
local Monopoly Bureau of Tobacco and Wine has resulted in the bizarre fact that anyone in 
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in exchange for supporting Taiwan’s bid to  join the World Trade Organiza- 
tion is  playing the primary role in opening the industry to the private 
sector. Schive and Jan (1997) study the process of financial deregulation 
in Taiwan during  1990-97  and find this was also true for the financial 
market. In other words, the shortest way to arrive at the liberalization of 
domestic markets in Taiwan is follow a path from Taipei via Washington 
back to Taipei. 
A general problem in the Taiwanese financial system is that the informal 
financial system is still not subject to prudential supervision, while the 
formal system is subject to insufficient preventive regulations and a lack of 
strict enforcement of those regulations that do exist. Three more specific 
structural problems threaten the Taiwanese financial system: first, multiple 
systems of  oversight  for  the  formal  financial  system;  second,  KMT- 
controlled financial institutions; and third, fraudulent privatization. The 
first two problems have not been dealt with by the financial reform, and 
the third is expected to be created by the reform. 
In the past  decade,  several ill-functioning financial institutions have 
suffered runs and even bankruptcy, all of them either credit cooperative 
associations or credit departments of farmer associations. The problem 
stems from the multiple systems governing formal financial institutions, 
one for Postal Remittances and Savings, another for credit co-ops (there 
is some difference between credit cooperative associations and credit de- 
partments of farmer associations), and a third for banks. The multisystem 
creates an unfair competitive disadvantage for normal banks. As men- 
tioned  earlier, credit co-ops were privileged  substitutes for commercial 
banks while private banks were completely prohibited  before 1990. The 
direct authorities over the credit departments of farmer and fishery associ- 
ations are the Ministry of the Interior and the Council of Agriculture, not 
the usual financial authorities. The problems are made worse by the fact 
that farmer and fishery associations have historically been the auxiliary 
election headquarters of the KMT.5  The credit departments of farmer as- 
sociations hold many bad and overdue loans. 
The second structural problem, the prominence of KMT-controlled en- 
terprises in the financial system, and the third problem, fraudulent priva- 
tization of state enterprises, must be discussed together because they are 
closely intertwined. 
The KMT owns or controls many enterprises in both the formal and 
informal financial sectors, as shown in table 7.4. In addition, the Central 
Investment Holding Company used to control two important financial 
institutions  through  the  KMT’s political  power without  investing any 
5.  The credit departments of the farmer and fishery associations are generally classified as 
“private” financial institutions (e.g., Shea 1994, 284). However, since the government effec- 
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money. The first is the International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).6 
ICBC was created prior to 1912 in the Ching Dynasty in mainland China 
as the Bank of the Great Ching. It then became the Bank of China in 1912 
after the revolution and was finally “privatized” in 1971 to avoid seizure 
of its overseas assets by the People’s Republic of China when it replaced 
the Republic of China in the United Nations. From  1971 to 1994, more 
than 75 percent  of ICBC stock shares were owned by  the Development 
Fund of the Executive Yuan. However, the Development Fund entrusted 
some 30 percent of the ICBC shares to the Central Investment Holding 
Company (CIHC), registered the shares in its name, and claimed ICBC 
was a “private” firm (for then the percentage of  state-owned shares was 
below 50 percent). During this period, ICBC was not monitored by  the 
Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. ICBC registered its investment in 
the Chinese American Bank in the United States using the same trick and 
was found out and fined by the U.S. government in 1997 for false registra- 
tion. The Development  Fund reclaimed the shares held  in  the CIHC’s 
name in  1994 and sold them. The second case is that of the China Bills 
Finance Company. The Development Fund held some 35 percent of the 
shares of China Bills Finance and registered all of them under the CIHC 
so that China Bills Finance was again claimed to be a private firm. The 
story is almost the same as that of  ICBC. During this period, there were 
three bill finance companies in Taiwan (the only securities finance com- 
pany  shown in  table  7.4 is  Fuh-Hwa Securities Finance, which is also 
owned by the KMT): Chung Hsing Bills Finance, owned by the KMT (see 
table 7.4); International Bills Finance, owned by ICBC; and China Bills 
Finance. The KMT thus controlled all of them. 
The privatization of the state-owned banks has long been a target. In 
fact, while ICBC was privatizing in 1971, privatization of the state-owned 
banks attracted much discussion. Taiwan launched its privatization pro- 
gram in  1989 and started to privatize some state-owned enterprises after 
1994. However, these privatizations always ended in one of three results: 
Type I privatizations are those in which the state maintains control of the 
“privatized” enterprise (Chang and Olds 1996). Type I1 privatizations are 
those in which the “privatized” enterprise becomes a party-controlled en- 
terprise. And Type 111 privatizations are simply a mix of Types I and 11. 
These privatizations are shown in table 7.6. The privatization of the state- 
6. In fact, a lot of  mistakes are made in distinguishing whether financial institutions in 
Taiwan are public, private, or KMT enterprises. While ICBC and China Bills Finance are 
both government owned, they have been controlled by  the KMT for a long time. The former 
was classified as privately owned and the latter as KMT owned (Yang 1994, 298). Farmer 
and fishery associations are totally controlled by  the government, and Fuh-Hwa Securities 
is  KMT controlled;  however,  all of  these were identified as privately owned  (e.g.,  Shea 
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Table 7.6  “Privatized” Public Enterprises 
Enterprise 
Chung Kuo Insurance 
BES Engineering 
China Petrochemical Development 
China Steel 
Liquidised Petroleum Supply 











Shareholding (%)  Party-ization? 
36.36 
0  Yes 
16.20  Partly 
42.10 
0  Yes 
45.04 
Note: Government shareholding and party-ization are as of 1 May 1997. 
owned banks will obviously follow the Type I method of privatization, as 
stated in Shea (1994, 260). There are other Type I state-controlled enter- 
prises, one of them being ICBC (Yang 1994, 298). 
When we  say a “publicly” owned and operated firm, the word “pub- 
licly” is put in quotation marks by Stiglitz: 
In different countries there are different patterns and forms of owner- 
ship and control-as  we would normally use those terms. While nomi- 
nally all the property may belong to all of the people, the “people” do 
not directly exercise control, and even in democratic governments, the 
link between those who actually make decisions and those on whose 
“behalf” they exercise control may be  very weak. In some countries 
control may be exercised directly from the planning “center” or the rele- 
vant industry ministry; in others a plant may be under the control of a 
large “firm,” or the plant may be more directly under the control of its 
managers. In all of these cases there are myriad influences that affect 
the decisions, including the interests of the workers at the plant. When 
plants are establishment controlled, it is more common for the managers 
to be exercising their control nominally on behalf of the workers, with 
some limited attention being paid to the remote interest in the state as 
the provider or “owner” of the capital. (1995, 171) 
“Public” companies not working in the public interest is a common theme. 
In Taiwan, the ruling party (KMT) and the state have been closely inter- 
twined, and the economic system has been designated “KMT-state capi- 
talism” (Chen et al. 1991). The ruling party is particularly powerful be- 
cause it is a Leninistic party, which means the party overrules government 
administrators. 
As a result of KMT-state capitalism, rumors of rent-seeking activities, 
insider trading, and, worse, policy insider trading have not ceased. Re- 
cently, it was rumored that up to twenty Democratic Progressive Party 
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during the 1997 assembly with the understanding that they would collabo- 
rate  with  KMT proposals  in  place  of  repayment  (Journalist, 18  May 
1997, 77). 
7.6  Concluding Remarks 
The business service sector gains importance in a newly industrialized 
country such as Taiwan. The government seems to be coming to the real- 
ization that business service industries are important, because five out of 
six designated  regional  operation  “centers”  in its biggest  development 
plan are in this sector. However, Chinese traditional  culture holds  this 
sector in contempt. Typical industrial policy still discriminates against it. 
To expose the conflicts and structural problems in this sector in Taiwan, I 
have used the financial system as an example. 
The literature devoting itself to Taiwan’s financial system typically con- 
fronts a paradox because it usually begins from “miracle” economic devel- 
opment experiences (high growth rate, equalized income distribution, low 
unemployment rate, and stable prices; e.g., Shea 1994, 222-23)  and ends 
up concluding that the financial system is underdeveloped, rigid, and in- 
efficient (e.g., Shea 1994, 266) or that “the maintenance of financial effi- 
ciency and financial stability simultaneously becomes a challenge for the 
government” (Yang 1997). While it may suggest to the third world that an 
underdeveloped financial system is compatible with an “economic mir- 
acle,” it  is an unsuccessful story from  the viewpoint  of the Taiwanese 
because the economic growth of Taiwan is  mediocre compared  to that 
of Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
The reform in the financial system reveals that liberalization and inter- 
nationalization are only half-measures. Privatization is partial and results 
in “nationalization of private-owned enterprises” and “party-ization.” So- 
lutions to the structural problems in the financial system are straightfor- 
ward.  Prospects  for  such  solutions  are  dim  under  the  current  ruling 
party, however. 
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Comment  Motoshige Itoh 
Ching-hsi Chang offers a good description of the basic characteristics of 
Taiwan’s traditional financial system and the process of its reform under 
international competition in the financial industry. Like such East Asian 
countries as Japan and Korea, Taiwan has a financial system that is char- 
acterized by various kinds of severe government regulations, such as in- 
terest ceilings and entry barriers, and by strong public control of the man- 
agement of financial institutions.  In fact, the paper has a section that 
compares Taiwan’s financial system with those in Japan and Korea. 
One of the distinguishing features of Taiwan’s financial system is the 
important portion of financial institutions owned and controlled by a po- 
litical party. This feature is not found in Japan. It is interesting to know 
how important this political feature was for the slow pace of financial 
deregulation in Taiwan. Not only Taiwan but also other countries in Asia 
have their own reasons for the slow or quick speeds of their deregulation 
processes. For example, when one discusses the process of deregulation in 
Japan, one cannot neglect the role of bureaucrats (Ministry of Finance) 
and their relations with the financial industry. Although Chang does not 
go into detail about the political elements of the deregulation of Taiwan’s 
financial system, more comment on this issue might make the process of 
deregulation clearer to readers. 
It is interesting to know that the structure of the traditional Taiwanese 
financial system has many features in common with the systems in Japan 
and Korea. The three countries also have the common feature that manu- 
facturing industries took off earlier than service sectors. In fact, the three 
countries achieved strong comparative advantages in their manufacturing 
sectors in spite of heavily regulated financial sectors. As Chang points out, 
Asian-style industrial policy, in which financial resources are concentrated 
in targeted industries and financial support is provided to export-oriented 
industry, is a vivid feature of Taiwan’s financial system; it is very similar 
to practices in Japan and Korea. There is a vast literature on the effect of 
industrial policy, especially financial support policy, on the industrializa- 
tion process; it might be useful to compare the case of Taiwan with other 
East Asian countries in this context. One might ask the following ques- 
tion: How important is the financial system-in  particular, its government- 
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controlled features-to  the process of industrialization in Taiwan, and 
how is the deregulation process related to the stage of economic develop- 
ment in Taiwan? Although the paper emphasizes pressure from the United 
States as the most important element promoting  deregulation, internal 
factors, especially the stage of economic development, must have an im- 
portant influence on the structure of the financial system. 
After the EASES meeting in Taiwan, currency crises hit several Asian 
countries,  and  the  financial  systems  in  these  countries  faced  serious 
difficulties. Taiwan was not among this group. It is interesting to see what 
differences in Taiwan allowed it to stay out of the financial and currency 
crisis. The paper  shows one difference between Taiwan  and the  other 
countries. The process of financial system deregulation in Taiwan seems 
to be slower than in neighboring countries. This slow process of deregula- 
tion may have kept Taiwan out of volatile short-term international capi- 
tal flows. 
Comment  Hirotaka Yamauchi 
Ching-hsi Chang’s paper deals with the regulatory reform of the financial 
market in Taiwan. The paper is very informative and interesting in that it 
depicts Taiwan’s financial market comprehensively and compares it with 
those of Japan and Korea. Chang then evaluates Taiwan’s financial policy, 
which  raises  many  obstacles  to liberalization,  and  concludes  that  the 
underdeveloped, rigid, and inefficient financial system creates a paradox 
when taken together with the economic development  “miracle” in that 
country. 
According to Chang, financial reform and regulatory policy change is 
now under way in Taiwan, but the complexity of the financial structure is 
the main obstacle to promoting real competition in this sector. Taiwan’s 
financial sector consists of  a formal system and an informal system. The 
distinction depends on whether or not a financial institution is subject to 
regulation by the Ministry of Finance. In the formal system, public owner- 
ship plays the main role, and the Kuomintang owns or controls most of 
the  other,  nonpublic  financial  institutions.  In this  situation, the  many 
differences in competitive position among financial institutions are likely 
to spur complaints about the straight introduction of competition. 
In a sense, it seems quite natural that this sector has a complex indus- 
trial configuration. Especially in an industry subject to tight government 
regulation, vested rights and interests are preserved, and mechanisms that 
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curtail malperformance cannot work well. As a result, over time various 
types of financial institutions have survived, which could make the indus- 
try more complex. As Chang indicates, this situation resembles that in 
Japan-one  reason why competition policies in Japan have been very slow 
in coming. 
Recognizing many difficulties, Chang points out that the main forces 
driving the liberalization of financial markets are “foreign pressures,” es- 
pecially  from  the  United  States,  and  international  competition.  The 
“shortest way to arrive at the liberalization of domestic markets in Taiwan 
is follow a path from Taipei via Washington back to Taipei.” And in order 
to create an international financial center, the government plans to imple- 
ment a fair and transparent financial policy as well as to prepare the coun- 
try’s infrastructure for international financial trade. This situation is also 
very similar to that in Japan. 
However, it seems to me that Chang’s paper overlooks a very important 
point, which could be  one of main sources of change in the industrial 
configuration.  That  is  the  dynamic  process  of  domestic  markets.  As 
pointed out in the paper, until now regulatory reform and privatization in 
Taiwan’s financial industry have not been so advanced; but competition, 
even in its infant stage, is likely to require further liberalization or deregu- 
lation, and such momentum has synergic effects on government policy. 
Individual entities want to act more freely to cope with emerging competi- 
tive pressures and therefore demand a more liberal environment. By  ana- 
lyzing explicitly and in detail the emerging competitive process in domestic 
financial markets, Chang’s paper could be a more powerful, more useful 
study of Taiwan’s financial sector. 